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In Search of a Less Tentative Totten
R. WAYNE ESTES*
INTRODUCTION
For more than a hundred years American courts have recog-
nized a financial institutional device that defies easy descrip-
tion. One cannot, with complete comfort, refer to it as a trust. At
the same time reluctance is encountered in terming the device
as purely an avenue for testamentary disposition. This device
has been described primarily in three ways. It is probably best
known as a "Totten trust" because of a leading case in which it
was recognized, although the case was not of first impression in
this country. Because of the institutions in which it is frequently
found, it is termed a "savings bank trust," but it is not limited to
these particular business organizations. Perhaps the most puzzl-
ing name used is "tentative trust" since there is sharp disagree-
ment as to exactly what the adjective "tentative" really means in
this application.
The thesis of this article is: (1) the savings bank trust is a
singular judicial creation permitted to meet what the courts
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considered to be a special societal need, (2) the need for its
existence transcended the normal constraints of the law of
trusts and the usual limitations imposed by the Statute of Wills
on testamentary dispositions, (3) the entire concept should be re-
examined with a more candid recognition of its origin and
theoretical bases, (4) much of the controversy and litigation
concerning savings bank trusts has arisen in connection with
their revocation, and revision of the pertinent law should clarify
and limit permissible avenues of revocation and (5) since the
device was judicially created, the courts, rather than the legisla-
tures, (except where the concept has been codified) should make
the needed revisions that would make savings bank trusts more
manageable and still serve the practical needs for which they
were initially recognized.
Definition
Reduced to its simplest elements, the savings bank trust re-
cognizes certain consequences of an account being opened in a
savings bank or similar institution' with the account being en-
tered in the following form: "depositor, in trust for benefi-
ciary". 2 The depositor can deal with the account as he pleases
during his lifetime, adding to it or withdrawing part or all of it.
If the depositor has not revoked the trust, upon his death any
balance left in the account is payable to the beneficiary. 3 The
1. Other organizations in which the practice is recognized include savings
departments of commercial banks, savings and loan associations, building and
loan associations and credit unions. The concept is also recognized for certifi-
cates of deposit issued to the purchaser as trustee for another. Annot. 46 A.L.R.
3d 487, 492 (1972); Note, Bank Account Trusts, 49 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (1963).
The recent New York statute codifying the concept utilizes the following
definition of a financial institution: "a bank, trust company, national banking
association, federal savings and loan association, savings bank, industrial bank,
private banker, foreign banking corporation, a savings institution chartered
and supervised as a savings and loan or similar institution under federal law or
the laws of a state, a federal credit union, or a credit union chartered and
supervised under the laws of a state." N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW §
7-5.1(c) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
2. Other acceptable forms are: "beneficiary, depositor trustee," "depositor
in trust for depositor and beneficiary, joint owners," and "depositor, trustee for
depositor and beneficiary, joint owners." Note, Bank Account Trusts, VA. L.
REV. 1189, (1963). The courts appear to be flexible in finding the savings bank
trust if depositor's intent appears clear; "trust," "trustee" or a variation thereof
normally seems to be an essential element of the account description.
3. "Where a person makes a deposit in a savings account in a bank or other
savings organization in his own name as trustee for another person intending to
reserve a power to withdraw the whole or any part of the deposit at any time
during his lifetime and to use as his own whatever he may withdraw, or other-
wise to revoke the trust, the intended trust is enforceable by the beneficiary
upon the death of the depositor as to any part remaining on deposit on his death
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beneficiary's knowledge of the deposit is immaterial.4 Ancillary
consequences to the device dealing with revocation, rights of the
depositor's creditors, subjection to needs of a mentally incom-
petent depositor, and rights of the deceased depositor's spouse
will be considered later as the characteristics of the device are
contrasted with the usual law of trusts.
In recognizing the device, great emphasis is placed on the
form of the deposit. The provable intent of the depositor con-
trols as to the effect of the account.5 The heart of the savings
bank trust concept turns upon the presumption or inference
6
if he has not revoked the trust." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 at 155
(1959).
4. Am. JUR. 2d, Banks § 390 at 357 (1963); G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
AND TRUSTEES, § 47 at 365 (2d ed. 1965); A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 58.1 at
523 (3d ed. 1967).
5. Regardless of any inference or presumption involved, (see note 6, infra)
evidence of the depositor's words or conduct can be admitted to show actual
intent. Some of the alternative intentions that may be shown are (1) that the
depositor intended to create no trust at all for some private purposes such as
evading a limitation on size of accounts, (2) that the depositor intended to create
an irrevocable trust, or (3) that the depositor intended to create a trust for a
limited purpose. See A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.1 at 520-23 (3d ed. 1967);
Note, Bank Account Trusts, 49 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (1963).
6. Some authorities and courts refer to a "presumption" while others indi-
cate an "inference" is involved. The trier of facts is required to make the
deduction of a presumption while the deductive device of an inference may or
may not be made by the trier of fact according to his own conclusion. The
presumption is mandatory, the inference, permissible. See Note, 39 CAL. L. REV.
314, 315 (1951).
While there is a basic and important difference in the two deductive ap-
proaches, it is not aptly illustrated in this application. Since such a wide range of
evidence is admissible to prove the depositor's intent, the distinction in practice
is usually not a decisive one. It has been suggested that if a presumption is
involved "the disposition to the beneficiary will be open to successful attack
only by affirmative and persuasive evidence of a lack of intent." Note, 39 CAL. L.
REV. 314, 315 (1951). Compare Kosloskye v. Cis, 70 Cal. App. 2d 174, 160 P.2d 565
(1945) and Brucks v. Home Federal Savings and Loan, 36 Cal. 2d 845, 228 P.2d
545 (1951). See Gulliver and Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51
YALE L.J. 1, 33 (1941). Professor Scott appears to use the deductive processes
interchangeably. A. ScoTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 58.1 at 520 (3d ed. 1967). It is
submitted that "rebuttable presumption" is the better description of the process
generally utilized.
In Massachusetts, which recognizes savings bank trusts, several decisions
indicate that some evidence beyond the mere form of deposit may be required to
establish the intent of the depositor. See Note, Bank Account Trusts, 49 VA. L.
REV. 1189, 1190 (1963), G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 47 at 365
(2d ed. 1965). Compare, A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.3 at 533-534 (3d ed.
1967).
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that the deposit in the prescribed form creates in the absence of
provable intent to the contrary. The words of form "A, in trust
for B", standing alone, are the basis for the rebuttable presump-
tion that the depositor intended the effect described above.
Societal Need
While the historical development of the savings bank trust will
be briefly treated, it is felt that this development can be best
understood in light of the social need that the device was felt to
meet. Judicial legislation was less common when the concept
was adopted, but it did exist. The Yale Law Journal in 1905
decreed the recognition of the savings bank trust in New York
as "judicial arbitration" as distinguished from "scientific ad-
ministration of the law" in an article dealing with "judicial
legislation." It termed the Totten7 decision as a "radical innova-
tion" that was difficult to justify.8
Such reactions are not rare when the courts venture into the
role of making law thought to be pre-empted by the legislative
branch of government. Since the savings bank trust decision
concept was contrary to both recognized trust law and the law
regulating testamentary disposition, it was deemed to be "judge
made" law. A comprehension of the motivation behind this judi-
cial venture into the world of the legislature is essential to an
understanding of the legal history of the device.
While legal authorities may disagree as to the legality or
theoretical bases of the savings bank trust, there appears to be
general agreement as to the end that was to be served. In its
simplest form, the reasoning behind the concept can be sum-
marized in the catch-phrase description of the device: "the poor
man's will". 9
The same 1905 Yale Law Journal article that condemned the
audacity of the New York Court of Appeals in rendering the
Totten opinion praised the result as a "piece of constructive
legislation" that "could hardly be too highly praised." The result
of the decision is said to "effectuate a custom that has grown up
among the humbler classes" and to be "so desirable" that the
author had often advocated legislation enacting the concept.1 0
7. In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748, 70 L.R.A. 711 (1904).
8. Larremore, Judicial Legislation in New York, 14 YALE L. J. 312, 316
(1905).
9. See generally Note, Totten Trust: The Poor Man's Will, 42 N.C. L. REV.
214 (1963).
10. Larremore, Judicial Legislation in New York, 14 YALE L. J. 312, 315-16
(1905).
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Since its inception legal authorities have viewed the savings
bank trust as an innoxious means for individuals of modest
means to pass money to beneficiaries of their choice after death
without the legal expenses of a will, administration and probate,
with the attendant delays. The device has been described as
filling "the gap between the inter vivos gift. . and the formal
will."'1 Further, the device's utility was increased by the ease
with which the amount to be devolved could be altered.
While any limitation that might be placed on the amount of
funds that can be transmitted by a savings bank trust is found in
the dollar limitations that the financial institution might have on
accounts, there is no restriction on accounts with multiple in-
stitutions. Any qualms about the legitimacy of the device are
frequently dismissed because the amount of funds involved are
small. 2 Perhaps this is a throwback to the early concept that it
was designed for the "humbler" classes. The distinction is lost
today. It has been suggested that a more contemporary name
would be "a middle class will". 13 Further, the savings bank trust
is praised as "convenient and safe"'4 because of the small likeli-
hood of fraud.
15
Professor Scott captures the spirit of the justification of the
savings bank trust:
In view ... of the convenience of this method of disposing of com-
paratively small sums of money without the necessity of resorting to
probate proceedings, there seems to be no sufficiently strong policy to
invalidate these trusts.
16
11. Note, Bank Account Trusts, 49 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (1963); Note,
Totten Trust: The Poor Man's Will, 42 N.C. L. REV. 214 (1963). The effect of
recognizing the savings bank trust has been said to "revolutionize devolutionary
techniques among an appreciable proportion of the community." In re Wein-
berg, 162 Misc. 867, 867-68, 296 N.Y. Supp. 7, 10 (1937). For discussion of the
salutary effects of the device, including more prompt payment to the benefi-
ciary, see Gulliver and Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE
L. J. 1, 39, (1941).
12. A. Scorr, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.3 at 527 (3d ed. 1967).
13. Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property,
Succession and Society, 1966 Wis. L. REv, 340, 369 (1966).
14. Note, Totten Trust: The Poor Man's Will, 42 N.C. L. REV. 214, 215 (1963).
15. "Not only is the amount involved usually comparatively small, but it is
easy to identify, and there is no great danger of fradulent claims resulting from
the absence of an attested instrument." A. ScoTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.3 at
527 (3d ed. 1967).
16. Id.
Thus, the recognition of the savings bank trust device was,
and is, based on a weighing of divergent policies. The irre-
gularies of the concept, when measured by normal trust law and
the Statute of Wills, are out-weighed by the absence of strong
objections from a practical viewpoint and the sound social need
to be served. Perhaps this is an example of judicial legislation at
its best.
History
The first American case, specifically upholding the current
concept of a savings bank trust was decided in 1855.17 Later
cases accepted the device but characterized the trust as irrevo-
cable, consistent with the usual presumption in the law of trusts.
These cases recognized two alternatives for the depositor's in-
tent: no trust or an irrevocable trust. 8
The now famous Totten19 decision posed the possibility of a
third intent: the desire to create a revocable trust. Further, the
decision indicated that the form of the deposit alone served as
the basis of a presumption that while the depositor intended to
create a trust he intended also to reserve a power to revoke and
deal with the trust as he pleased during his lifetime. The court's
opinion became the charter of the savings bank trust concept:
A deposit by one person of his own money, in his own name as
trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish an irrevocable
trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust merely,
revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the gift in his
lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration, such as the delivery
of the passbook or notice to the beneficiary. In case the depositor dies
before the beneficiary without revocation, or some decisive act or
declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute
trust was created as to the balance on hand at the death of the de-
positor.
20
In the years that followed a growing number of states recog-
nized the basic Totten doctrine. 21 The doctrine has been
codified in two states,22 but it exists largely by virtue of judicial
opinion.
17. Witzel v. Chapin, 3 Bradf. Surr. 386 (1855). For a detailed analysis of this
early case see Wittebort, Savings Account Trusts: A Critical Analysis, 49
NOTRE DAME LAW. 686, 687-89 (1974).
18. A. Scorr, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.2 at 524, 525 (3d ed. 1967).
19. In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748, 70 L. R. A. 711 (1904).
20. Id. at 179 N.Y. at 125, 71 N.E. at 752.
21. At latest count, it appears that eighteen jurisdictions have accepted the
common law savings bank trust concept, some in slightly differing forms. For
decisions in these jurisdictions see A. ScoTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.3 at 528-
530 ft. note 5 (3d ed. 1967) and supp. 1977 at 53, 54.
22. New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17: 9A-216 (West 1963); New York, N.Y.
ESTATE, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW § 7-5.1 - 7-5.7 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
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Financial institutions are not known for their lack of activity
in legislative halls and where the doctrine has been recognized
they have moved to bring about protective legislation. Because
the savings bank trust concept is so solidly based on the de-
positor's intent and because the breadth of evidence that can be
admitted to demonstrate such intent is so broad, the liability of
financial institutions is considerable as they pay designated be-
neficiaries. To guard against this potential liability, statutes
were passed in many states permitting the financial institution,
upon the death of depositor, to pay the beneficiary without
liability even if the trust has, in fact, been revoked by some
means unknown to the institution.2 3 These statutes have been
held to be merely protective of the institution and not legislative
approval of the savings bank concept.24 It is submitted that if
the effort and expense required to enact these statutes had been
directed toward codifying the savings bank trust doctrine with
clarifying provisions reforming needed portions of the concept,
much of the past litigation concerning the device, particularly
relating to revocation, could have been avoided. But, alas, that is
not the way of the world (or of the legislative process).
Theoretical Concepts
The legal stability of the savings bank trust seems secure.
However, the basis for the arrival at this destination has been
the subject of divergent judicial views. Indeed, this is not sur-
prising since the acceptance of the concept was based more on
fulfilling what was conceived to be a social need, than as a result
of legal reasoning. The result established, the courts have used
varying means of sustaining it. Perhaps this is a necessary inci-
23. For a listing of jurisdictions having such statutes and statutory citations
see A. ScoTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 58.3 at 530, 531 ft. note 7 (3d ed. 1967) and
supp. 1977 at 54.
"The institution in which an 'in trust' account is maintained normally has two
general desires with respect to such accounts-that the-purposes and intentions
of the depositor be honored and that liability for wrongful payment of funds be
avoided. *** Such statutory announcements allow banks to rely upon their
records in all cases except those in which they are in receipt of notice in proper
form that there is an adverse claim to the fund in question." Cohan, Pennsylva-
nia Tentative Trusts: Problems and Problem Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 972, 976
(1962). For a description of problems facing financial institutions prior to the
enactment of such statutes, see Note, Disposition of Bank Accounts: The Poor
Man's Will, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 103, 113-14 (1953).
24. A. Scorr, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.3 at 531 (3d ed. 1967).
dent to judicial legislation. When the legislature speaks to create
law, it needs no greater portfolio than its constitutional man-
date. When the judiciary creates new law in an area normally
reserved to the legislature, it does not engage in bold Olympian
edicts, but usually finds a basis for its decision among existing
legal principles already recognized.2 5
JUDICIAL RATIONALE OR RATIONALIZATION
In sustaining the savings bank trusts, courts were faced with
two major obstacles, (1) the existing law of trusts and (2) the
restrictions placed on testamentary dispositions by the Statute
of Wills. Each of these will be dealt with later in the article.
Variance with either or both of these existing bodies of law did
not greatly trouble the courts as they moved to sustain the
savings bank trust concept. The relative gravity of the two areas
of variance seemed to influence individual courts as they estab-
lished the basis for allowing the device. For this reason, the
rationale for the device varies between jurisdictions. 26 Funda-
mental in the differing approaches is the matter of timing.
When in fact did the device become effective? Was it at the time
of the deposit or did it spring into being at the depositor's
death? 27 Inhering in this dilemma is the exact meaning of the
25. "In the legislative process there is neither beginning nor end. It is an
endless free-wheeling experiment, without institutional restraints, that may
have rational origins and procedures and goals or that may lack them. In
contrast, a judge invariably takes precedent as his starting point; he is con-
strained to arrive at a decision in the context of ancestral judicial experience:
the given decisions or, lacking these, the given clues. Even if his search of the
past yields nothing, so that he confronts a truly unprecedented case, he still
arrives at a decision in the context of judicial reasoning with recognizeable ties
to the past; by its kinship thereto it not only establishes the unprecedented case
as a precedent for the future, but integrates it into the often rewoven but always
unbroken line with the past." Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A
Question of Judicial Responsibility. 28 HASTINGs L. J. 533, 536, 537 (1977).
26. The savings bank trust has "posed conceptional problems of some nice-
ty to generations of judges and theorists." Wittebort, Savings Account Trusts: A
Critical Examination 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 686, 686 (1974).
27. "The problem immediately arises as to the moment of the creation of
this legal relationship termed a tentative trust. To those who contend that the
relationship created is essentially a trust, the time of its inception must perforce
be the moment the deposit is made or the moment of the last deposit or with-
drawal, for they are the only instances at which the depositor evinces any intent
upon which a trust can be based. There is authority to the effect that this is the
doctrine of the tentative trust as laid down by the New York courts-that a trust
is created at the time of the deposit, establishing rights in the named beneficiary
subject to a power of revocation. On the other side there are those who consider
the tentative trust to be sui generis, a mere fiction to obtain a desirable result,
and they would stringently limit the trust analogy. Naturally, to them the fiction
is not to be indulged in until necessary, i.e., until the death of the depositor. They
suggest that no trust is created until then, that no change of legal status is
[Vol. 5: 21, 1977] A Less Tentative Totten
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term "tentative '28 so handily used by the Totten court. The
word is subject to two interpretations. It could mean merely that
the trust is revocable by nature.2 9 On the other hand, "tentative"
is subject to being interpreted as "incomplete"."
The first interpretation focuses attention primarily on the
device's compliance with the usual law of trusts. Since the sav-
ings bank trust is not complete or effective until the depositor's
death, the second alternative examines whether or not the
scheme can be reconciled with the Statute of Wills.
The theory chosen does not greatly affect the result reached
but it is a factor in understanding the judicial opinions in vari-
ous jurisdictions that sustain the device. Sometimes the theory
followed will be a determining factor in the courts' decisions
concerning rights of the depositor's creditors, surviving spouse,
etc.
The purpose of these comments is not to re-open the question
of whether the savings bank trust should be recognized. That
question is well settled today. The aim of these remarks is to
focus attention on needed judicial reform. It is felt that a brief
effected by making the deposit 'in trust for' during the life of the depositor.
Under this tentative trust theory the beneficiary's rights remain inchoate until
the depositor dies without having disturbed the declaration. Succinctly stated,
the conflict is as to whether the 'trust' is initiated at the time of the deposit and
is subject to a condition subsequent of revocation or whether the depositor's
death is a condition precedent to its creation." Note, The Theory of the Tenta-
tive Trust, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 847, 848 (1939).
28. In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 125, 71 N.E. 748, 752, 70 L.R.A. 711 (1904).
29. A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 58.4 A at 541 (3d ed. 1967). G. BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 47 at 352 (2d ed. 1965). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 58 comment c (1959).
30. A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.4 at 541 (3d ed. 1967). Wittebort,
Savings Account Trusts, A Critical Examination, 49 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 686,
691 (1974).
"[A] tentative trust [is] a trust that did not spring into being until the death of
the depositor-and vanished the moment of its creation." Note, Tentative Trust
Deposits, 39 DICK. L. REV. 37, 38 (1934).
"It will be seen upon a careful reading [of the Totten decision] that the trust is,
in the first place, described as a 'tentative trust', by which we understand a
suggested or proposed trust, not completed or consumated. *** It would seem to
follow that until the depositor's death the funds are impressed with no trust in
the sense that any title thereto, actual or beneficial, vest in the proposed benefi-
ciary.. . ." Matter of U.S. Trust Co., of New York 117 App. Div. 178. 180, 102
N.Y. Supp. 271, 272 (1st Dept. 1907) aff'd without opinion, 189 N.Y. 500, 81 N.E.
1177 (1907). See, G. Bogert, The Creation of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits,
1 CORNELL L. Q. 159, n.86 at 171 (1916).
review of the areas in which the device is sui generis will aid in
demonstrating that reform should not be restrained in an area
of law that at best can be described as unorthodox.
TRUST LAW
As a conventional trust, the savings bank trust conforms to
many normal concepts,31 but nevertheless has been termed an
"anomaly". 32 The basic elements of a settlor-trustee, res, and
beneficiary are easily discerned.33 For classification purposes, it
must be termed an express trust, if it is a trust at all.34 Intent to
create the device, however it is characterized, is evident or ar-
rived at by presumption. The act of creation, whether by decla-
ration or transfer, can be found in the act of deposit, although
by some theories the trust itself does not arise until the death of
the depositor. Difficulty begins when one seeks to define the
exact fiduciary responsibility of the depositor-trustee and the
relationship of the trustee to the beneficiary is nebulous, as is a
description of the beneficiary's interest.35 Trusts are generally
31. The Restatement defines a trust as "a fiduciary relationship with re-
spect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is held
to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person,
which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959).
32. Comment, Matter of Totten-An Anomaly in the Law of Trusts, 6
DEPAUL L. REV. 117, 117 (1956).
"Unnecessary use of anomalous fictions such as the Totten Trust may prove
in the long run to be detrimental in that it opens the door for further erosions of
some of the settled doctrines upon which the stability of trust law depends." Id.
at 140, n.142.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 3 (1959).
34. It should be borne in mind that many authorities feel that the savings
bank trust, however it is characterized and described, should not be termed a
"trust" at all and that the terminology is the result of stubborn judicial insist-
ance as a handy method of validating the savings bank trust. Wittebort, Savings
Account Trusts: A Critical Examination, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 686,686 (1974).
"It will be conceded with some reluctance perhaps, but with little doubt, that
the average trust deposit is not a trust." Note, Tentative Trust Deposits, 39
DICK. L. REV. 37, 38 (1934).
35. Pertinent to any description of the depositor's legal relationship or duty
to the beneficiary or characterization of the beneficiary's interest is the theoret-
ical determination of when the trust relationship arises, i.e., at the time of the
deposit or at the time of the depositor's death. See A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF
TRUSTS 58.4A at 541, 542 (3d ed. 1967). See note 27, supra.
The relationship has been called "incipient" and "anticipatory", lacking in
any true fiduciary nature. Wittebort, Savings Account Trusts: A Critical Ex-
amination, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 686, 690-93 (1974).
"There is no separation of legal and equitable ownership, no fiduciary duty on
the part of the depositor arises toward the designated beneficiary, nor is a
correlative right created in the beneficiary to compel the trustee to account."
Note, Tentative Trust Deposits, 39 DICK. L. REV. 37, 38 (1934).
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considered to be irrevocable, unless specifically made revoc-
able.36 Obviously, the savings bank trust's basic presumption is
to the contrary.3 7 The death of the beneficiary prior to the death
of the trustee or settlor does not affect the conventional trust,38
yet it ends the savings bank trust.39 The mere reservation of a
power of revocation does not necessarily subject the trust res to
the creditors of a traditional settlor, ° yet such access is allowed
during the lifetime of the savings bank trust depositor.4' If the
depositor of a savings bank trust is judged mentally incompe-
The real nature of the interest of the beneficiary is illusive due primarily to the
differing theories upon which the savings bank trust is permitted. Some have
termed the interest as simply an "equitable" one with enjoyment postponed
until the depositor's death. Boyce, Joint Bank Accounts with Right of Survivor-
ship: A Conceptional Maze, 6 CAP. L. REV. 477, 479 (1977). Other characteriza-
tions of the interest are "inchoate", and as "evanescent as the prospects of
legatees in wills of living persons." Note, Tentative Trust Deposits, 39 DICK. L.
REV. 37, 40 (1934). The interest has been described as a "mere expectancy."
Comment, Matter of Totten-An Anomaly in the Law of Trusts, 6 DEPAUL L.
REV. 117, 136 (1956).
36. A. SCOTT, 4 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 330 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 330 (1959); G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 998
(2d ed. 1962).
37. A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.1 at 520 (3d ed. 1967); G. BOGERT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 47 at 352-353 (2d ed. 1965).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 142 (1959), A. SCOTT, 2 THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 128.8 at 1046 (3d ed. 1967); G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 38 at 138 (5th ed. 1973).
39. A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.4 at 536-537 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58, comment c (1959). It has been suggested that this
conclusion is based on the analogy of the doctrine of a legacy lapsing if the
legatee predeceases the testator. See Gulliver and Tilson, Classification of
Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L. J. 1, 34 (1941). Such reasoning demonstrates
how the differing concepts of what interest the beneficiary has and when it
takes effect can affect secondary issues in connection with savings bank trusts.
See generally, Tabis, Illinois Totten Trust: The Rights of Legal Representa-
tives of a Beneficiary Who Predeceases the Trustee, 48 CHI-KENT L. REV. 107
(1971).
40. A. SCOTT, 4 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 330.12 at 2613 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330, comment o (1959).
41. A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.5 at 543-544 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58, comment d (1959). Here again the theory of the
nature and timing of the savings bank trust may affect the decision concerning
the rights of the creditors. The general rule in this regard is consistent with the
"tentative" theory-the account is the depositor's property until his death. If the
"revocable trust" theory is followed, the beneficiary's present interest should be
protected from the depositor's creditors during his lifetime. This view is fol-
lowed in Maryland, Fairfax v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 175 Md. 136, 199 A.
872 (1938). See Wittebort, Savings Account Trusts: A Critical Examination, 49
NOTRE DAME LAW. 686, 695 (1974) and Richie, What Is a Will?, 49 VA. L. REV. 759,
762 (1963).
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tent following its creation, the account can be reached for his
needs upon judicial petition by the depositor's guardian,42 while
there would be no basis for such relief under traditional trust
law.
A revocable trust in which the settlor has a beneficial life
interest must normally be termed "illusory" as opposed to
"real" for a surviving spouse of the settlor to have access to the
res when claiming against the will or claiming a statutory share
of the estate.43 Some jurisdictions have imposed different tests
in allowing such access to the savings bank trust of the de-
positor, making the account more accessible to the surviving
spouse.44
THE STATUTE OF WILLS
Perhaps the most serious objection to the savings account
trust is its lack of compliance with the Statute of Wills. 45 Am-
bulatory by nature and testamentary in effect, savings bank
trusts have been rejected in some jurisdictions since they are
lacking in the formalities prescribed by the Statute of Wills.
46
42. A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.4 at 539-540 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58 comment c (1959). This treatment is more consis-
tent with the revocable trust theory in view of the judicial action necessary to
reach the account. See Note, Bank Account Trusts, 49 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1199
(1963) and Note, 26 MINN. L. REV. 767 (1942).
43. A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 57.5 at 509-515 (3d ed. (1967); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57, comment c (1959); G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TRUSTS, § 22 at 59 (5th ed. 1973); R. Newman, NEWMAN ON TRUSTS 44-45
(2d ed. 1955). See Newman v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937).
44. A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 58.5 at 544-49 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58, comment e (1959); See, Sobel, Joint and Totten
Savings Accounts 171 N.Y.L.J. 90,1,4 (1974); Note, Bank Account Trusts, 49 VA.
L. REV. 1189, 1202-1205; Note, Disposition of Bank Accounts: The Poor Man's
Will, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 103,115-116 (1953); Casenote, 1 BUFFALO L. REV. 40,41-42
(1951); See Truax v. Southwestern College, 214 Kan. 873, 522 P.2d 412 (1974)
noted in 14 WASHBURN L. J. 194 (1975); compare: In Re Halpern's, 303 N.Y. 33, 100
N.E. 2d 120 (1951).
A recent Illinois case viewed the Totten trust as upheld per se, but required
that it yield to the spouse's claim because of statutory policy which protected the
surviving spouse. Montgomery v. Michaels, 54 Ill. 2d 532, 301 N.E. 2d 465 (1973),
noted in 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 1247 (1974) and 50 CHI-KENT L. REV. 159 (1973).
45. See generally A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 58.3 at 526-535 (3d ed.
1967).
46. "[I]n a few states it has been held that the fact that the depositor intends
to reserve control over the deposit during his lifetime makes the deposition
incomplete prior to his death, with the result that the beneficiary is not entitled
to the deposit on the death of the depositor, even though the depositor has not
attempted to revoke the trust. In these cases the courts took the view that the
disposition is incomplete during the lifetime of the depositor, and that the
disposition is therefore testamentary." A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 58.3 at
529-530 (3d ed. 1967). For a listing of these jurisdictions see A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW
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However, under both the revocable trust and tentative trust
theories there seems to be little doubt that the savings bank
trust is testamentary in nature. Under the tentative trust theory,
the device takes effect only on death and is patently difficult to
square with the Statute of Wills. If the trust is merely revocable
by nature, it still fails to meet the standards usually applied to
inter vivos trusts in determining if they violate the Statute of
Wills. 47 The modern inter vivos revocable trust, in which the
settlor retains a life interest and various powers of control, has
seen a liberalization in some courts' views of the requirements
for such a trust being held testamentary and thereby necessitat-
ing compliance with the Statute of Wills. 48 Even under the mod-
ern rule a trust will still be held testamentary if no interest
passes to the beneficiary prior to the death of settlor, i.e., is only
OF TRUSTS, § 58.3 at 530 footnote 6 (3d ed. 1967) and Supp. 1977 at 54. See
Comment, Matter of Totten-An Anomaly in the Law of Trusts, 6 DEPAUL L.
REV. 117, 129 (1956).
47. Wittebort, Savings Account Trusts: A Critical Examination 49, NOTRE
DAME LAW. 686, 692 (1974).
The mere power of revocation in an inter vivos trust, even coupled with a
beneficial life interest, is not generally held sufficient to invalidate the trust as
being testamentary and incompatible with the Statute of Wills. A. SCOTT, 1 THE
LAW OF TRUSTS § 56.6 at 473 (3d ed. 1967). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57
and § 57.2 (1959). When the settlor's power of revocation and beneficial life
interest are added to the settlor's broad powers to treat the trust generally as if it
were his own property, the "will-like" quality of the arrangement causes some
courts to invalidate the arrangement as testamentary. Id.
[In the case of a tentative trust] "the critical quantum of control is reached
with the addition of the power in the settlor to do what he wishes with the
funds." Wittebort, Savings Account Trusts: A Critical Examination, 49 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 686, 692 (1974).
"[T]he reservation of the depositor's right to control the funds, normally an
unobjectionable incident of inter vivos trusts, has been extended to the point
where it collides with the interest of the beneficiary and raises serious questions
as to the certainty of the trust's subject matter." Id. at 694.
48. Probably the most widely discussed case in which a court refused to
strike down such a trust for failure to comply with the Statute of Wills is Farkas
v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 125 N.E. 2d 600 (1955). In this case the settlor-trustee
reserved: (1) the income of the res (stock) for his use (2) the right as trustee to
vote, sell, redeem, exchange or otherwise deal with the stock (proceeds from
sales inured directly to the settlor), (3) the right to revoke and (4) the right to
change the beneficiary. The stock was registered in the name of the settlor as
trustee. The beneficiary was to become absolute owner of the stock upon the
settlor's death unless the settlor had changed the beneficiary or revoked the
trust; written notice to the company was required of either revocation or change
of beneficiary. The court upheld the trust as non-testamentary. It is submitted
that the approval of the Farkas trust was probably based actually on a policy
consideration, as distinguished from a technical reason, since the formalities of
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effective on the settlor's death. However, if an interest is held to
pass to the beneficiary during the settlor's life, the trust is up-
held under the liberal rule.49
The requirement of finding of an "interest" passing to charac-
terize the trust as non-testamentary has been questioned in the
light of legal reality.50 Even if the requirement is recognized, it is
difficult to identify or describe the interest received by the bene-
ficiary of the savings bank trust.5 1 Some authorities have con-
tended that the savings bank trust should be sustained because
of its similarity to the modern revocable inter vivos trust in
which the settlor retains a life interest and broad powers.52
Others consider the two devices nonanalogous. 53
Of course, the basic rigidity of the application of the Statute of
Wills has been questioned. In this approach, the issue becomes
whether a device, testamentary in effect, provides the basic
the arrangement satisfied the fundamental policy requirements undergirding
the formalities prescribed by the Statute of Wills. See Langbein, Substantial
Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 505-506 (1975).
49. "Holding an interest to pass from the donor to the donee at the inception
of the transaction is the usual means by which courts lift transactions with a
'testamentary look' out of the conventional definition of a will and the scope of
the statutes of wills." Richie, What is a Will? 49 VA. L. REV. 759, 766 (1963).
It is submitted that in the Farkas and similar cases the courts are basically
carving out another exception to the Statute of Wills. However, they still look to
the ancient trust law sine qua non of an interest passing to the beneficiary prior
to the depositor's death to sustain the trust. See A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS,
§ 56.6 at 473 (3d ed. 1967). If such an interest passes, the settlor-trustee is held to
have a fiduciary responsibility, helping to validate the arrangement. Farkas v.
Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 432, 125 N.E. 2d 600, 608 (1955); Richie, What Is a Will? 49
VA. L. REV. 759, 764-766 (1963) Compare note 27 supra.
50. "To nullify such a useful device because of the conception that no
interest passes until death is to make an intellectual exercise of the most ab-
stract character predominant, without justification in policy, over social utility
and the desires of the individual." Gulliver and Tilson, Classification of
Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L. J. 1, 39 (1941).
51. "[T]his interest is subject not only to revocation, in whole or in part, by
the depositor; it is also subject to partial or complete defeasance as a result of
judicially sanctioned invasion of the fund by the depositor's creditors, personal
representatives or surviving spouse." Wittebort, Savings Account Trusts, A
Critical Examination, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 686, 692 (1974); See generally note
35 supra.
52. Comment, Matter of Totten-An Anomaly in the Law of Trusts, 6
DEPAUL L. REV. 117, 136 (1956); Richie, What is a Will?, 49 VA. L. REV. 759, 763
(1963); Casenote, 23 DEPAuL L. REV. 1247, 1249 (1974).
53. "The usual inter vivos trust is customarily set out in a detailed written
document, to the content and terms of which the settlor and his attorney will
normally have devoted much time and thought .... But the situation of a bank
deposit is quite different. The trust is not stated in any detail, its express terms
being confined to the form of the account, sometimes expanded briefly in a
supplementary agreement with the bank." Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of
Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L. JOUR. 1, 37, 38 (1941); See Wittebort, Savings
Account Trusts: A Critical Examination, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 686, 692 (1974).
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safeguards for which the Statute of Wills was originally de-
signed.5 4
There has been some effort to square the savings bank trust
with the Statute of Wills. Professor Scott, conceding that the
trust is "thin", reasons that the trust is established at the time of
the deposit but is merely subject to a condition subsequent of
revocation rather than a condition precedent of the depositor's
death.55 It has also been argued that the beneficiary receives a
present interest "with enjoyment both postponed and tentative"
and therefore the trust is not testamentary.5 6 Another expres-
sion of the same theory is that the beneficiary has a "present,
though defeasible" interest when the account is opened, keeping
the device from being testamentary in character. 51
A more realistic analysis is that the savings bank trust is a
judicially imposed exception to the normal strictures of the
Statute of Wills.5 8 Professor Scott's frank statement in 1930
54. "The abuses at which the Statute of Wills are armed are forgery, per-
jury, fraud, coercion, mistake, hasty and impulsive action and faulty memory."
Richie, What Is a Will? 49 VA. L. REV. 759, 761 (1963).
"The law of wills is notorious for its harsh and relentless formalism .... The
finding of a formal defect should lead not to automatic invalidity, but to a
further inquiry: does the noncomplying document express the decedent's tes-
tamentary intent, and does its form sufficiently approximate Wills Act formality
to enable the court to conclude that it serves the purposes of the Wills Act."
Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489
(1975).
Professor Langbein indicates that the Statute of Wills has the following valid
functions: evidentiary, channeling, and cautionary. Id. at 492-496. He concludes
that these policies or functions are served in the case of the savings bank trust:
"That smallish sums are typically involved bears on the cautionary policy. The
channeling policy is well served in the out-of-court routine of bank practice. The
cautionary and evidentiary policies are thought to be served by the interview
with the bank officer and the execution of the signature card which would seem
to discourage hasty and impulsive action and to reduce the danger of forgery,
fraud and coercion to a minimum." Id. at 507. See Richie, What Is a Will? 49 VA.
L. REV. 759, 763 (1963).
55. A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.3 at 527 (3d ed. 1967); Scott, Trusts
and the Statute of Wills, 43 HARV. L. REV. 521, 538, 543 (1930).
56. Note, Totten Trust: The Poor Man's Will, 42 N.C.L. REV. 214,217 (1963);
see Friedman, The Law of the Living, The Law of the Dead: Property, Succes-
sion and Society, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 340, 369 (1966).
57. G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 47 at 343 (2d ed. 1965).
58. Wittebort, Savings Account Trusts: A Critical Examination, 49 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 686, 692, 699 (1974); Note, Bank Account Trusts, 49 VA. L. REV. 1189,
1193 (1963).
"The Totten trust is functionally equivalent to a will in every respect ....
Despite some trouble in fitting the Totten Trust into accepted doctrine, the
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helps focus attention on reality rather than theory: "It is clear
that a similar trust of property other than savings bank deposits
would be invalid."
5 9
THE MALESTROM OF REVOCATION
An inherent part of the theoretical foundation of the savings
bank trust is its revocability. 60 This quality provides the device
with much of the social utility for which it was recognized. Its
ambulatory nature gives it the will-like quality that makes it an
appealing way to dispose of funds after death. Yet, this aspect of
the device has been the storm center of the controversies and
attendant litigation that have arisen in connection with such
trusts.61 While the financial institutions may with impunity pay
the beneficiary upon the depositor's death, the potential con-
troversy persists. If it can be shown that the trust was revoked
prior to the death of the depositor, then the depositor's estate or
legatees have a claim for the funds. What was judicially con-
ceived as a simple, uncomplicated and perhaps lawyer-free
method of passing wealth is complicated by the multiple av-
enues of available revocation. This particular aspect of the de-
vice has caused the entire concept to be termed a "tenuous and
uncertain" method of disposing of property after death.6 2
courts have found ways to legitimize this mode of bypassing the Statute of
Wills." Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property,
Succession, and Society. 1966 Wis. L. REV. 340, 369 (1966).
"As a practical matter it seems to make no difference whether a transaction
with a 'testamentary look' is excluded from the scope of the Statute of Wills on
the 'presently passing interest' theory, or by explicitly or implicitly recognizing
it as an exception to the conventional definition of a will." Richie, What Is a
Will?, 49 VA. L. REV. 759, 767 (1963).:
59. Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills, 43 HARV. L. REV. 521, 543 (1930).
60. There could appear here a discussion of revocation in connection with
the basic question dividing the two theories concerning the nature of a savings
bank trust: i.e., whether the trust arises at the deposit or upon the depositor's
death. In theory, under the pure tentative concept there is not technical revoca-
tion prior to the trust becoming effective upon the death of the depositor, rather
the trust is merely never effective because the condition precedent is never met.
However, the courts appear to use revocation terminology rather indiscrimi-
nately under either theory; the term will be used herein in the broad sense
encompassing either concept of the savings bank trust.
For a discussion of revocation terminology in relation to savings bank trust
theories, see, G. Bogert, The Creation of Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits, 1
CORNELL L. Q. 159, n.86, page 171 (1916).
61. "Since the Totten trust is commonly employed as a substitute for tes-
tamentary disposition, litigation frequently centers on the issue of revocation by
the depositor." 7 NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE-E.P.T.L. § 7-5.2 [2] at 132 (Rel. No.
5-1975), See Fried, Decedent's Estates, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 311, 314, (1975).
62. Note, 39 CAL. L. REV. 314, 315 (1951). Because of theproblems of revoca-
tion, and potential revocation, as seen demonstrated in California cases dealing
with tentative trusts, Witkin concludes that "the tentative trust created in the
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As divided as the courts that accept the savings bank trust
concept may be as to the nature and theoretical basis for permit-
ting savings bank trusts, there seems to be almost unanimous6 3
agreement, where unaltered by statute64 as to how they may be
revoked.6 5 The recognized basic methods of revocation largely
remain unchanged from the original Totten enunciation of the
doctrine 66 which is reannounced in the Restatement.67
As in its creation, the intent, or presumed intent, of the de-
positor governs in its ability to be revoked. While a great leap of
faith is required to establish the rebuttable presumption of in-
tent to create the revocable savings bank trust, an even broader
bound is required to presume that the depositor intended to
have all of the avenues of revocation open to him. This latter
presumption evidently flows from the initial presumption, since
they both supposedly reflect the intent of the depositor, they
ostensibly would enure to his benefit, or at least his wishes. It is
submitted that it is likely that the depositor in the absence of
legal advice or the unlikely counsel of a teller or other official of
the institution involved, would reasonably conclude he could
only end the arrangement by simply withdrawing the funds, the
usual method of dealing with such accounts.
68
However, the courts, in the absence of credible evidence to the
contrary, hold that the savings bank trust can be revoked or
terminated69 by any of several means:
70
ordinary deposit form is unreliable, and that the formal trust in-
strument. . .should be used." B. WITKIN, 7 SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Trusts
§ 18 at 5382 (8th ed. 1974).
63. The notable exception is the Supreme Court of Maryland. The Mary-
land view will be developed in EFFORTS AT REFORM infra.
64. New Jersey and New York have codified the savings bank trust concept
and both statutes altered the common law rules of revocation. See n.107 and 108
infra.
65. For a comprehensive consideration of savings bank revocation general-
ly, see ANNOT. 46 ALR 3d 487 (1972).
66. In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 125, 71 N.E. 748,752,70 L. R. A. 711 (1904). See
discussion under HISTORY, supra.
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 58, comment c (1959).
68. See R. NEWMAN, NEWMAN ON TRUSTS, 76 (2d ed. 1955).
69. While revocation and termination can be technically contrasted, the
differences are not material in this context and the terms are used interchange-
ably in these comments.
70. See generally, Wittebort, Savings Account Trusts: A Critical Examina-
tion, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW., 686, 689 (1974); and Note, Bank Account Trusts, 49
VA. L. REV. 1189, 1196 (1963).
1. Withdrawal of funds, with pro tanto revocation as to any
amount withdrawn less than the entire amount.7 1
2. Change of the account designation to eliminate the "in trust"
aspect or by designating another beneficiary.
72
3. Death of the beneficiary prior to the death of the depositor.7 3
4. By the depositor's will containing explicit mention of the deposit
or by a deposition inconsistent with the deposit (a mere residuary gift
will not revoke).7 4
5. By application to the court by the depositor's guardian when the
depositor is adjudged mentally incompetent and the funds are needed
for the depositor's care. 5
6. Any decisive manifestation of the depositor's intent. No particu-
lar formalities are needed and oral statements and inter vivos writings
are considered.
7 6
Problem Areas In Revocation
The appropriateness of various mod~s of revocation available
to the depositor, such as withdrawal of funds or change of
account designation, is apparent. The unusual revocation by the
predeceasing of the beneficiary causes little difficulty since the
depositor remains free to retain the funds, name another benefi-
ciary or give the funds to the estate or a relative of the deceased
beneficiary. While one might speculate if the depositor intended
to be able to revoke the savings bank trust by his will, there can
be no doubt as to his latest intent since the testamentary revoca-
tion must be specific or inconsistent with the savings bank trust
for a revocation to be effected. Perhaps the testamentary nature
of the device is sufficient reason for the availability of such
revocation by will. However, it is interesting to note that the
Uniform Probate Code does not allow revocation of the savings
account trust by will.
7 7
71. A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 58.4 at 535-541 (3d ed. 1967); G.
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 47 at 354 (2d ed. 1965); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58, comment c (1959).
72. G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 47 at 354 (2d ed. 1965);
10 AM. JUR. 2d, BANKS § 397 at 369-370 (1963).
73. A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 58.4 at 536-537 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58, comment c (1959); R. Newman, NEWMAN ON
TRUSTS, 78-79 (1955).
74. A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 58.4 at 537-538 (3d ed. 1967); G.
BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 47 at 354 (2d ed. 1965); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58, comment c (1959); R. Newman, NEWMAN ON
TRUSTS 79 (2d ed. 1955).
75. A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 58.4 at 539-540 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58, comment c (1959).
76. "[T]he trust is revoked by any words or conduct on the part of the
depositor indicating an intention to revoke it." A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS, §
58.4 at 536 (3d ed. 1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 58, comment c
(1959).
77. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 6-104.
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An avenue of revocation that is perhaps furthest from the
depositor's probable intent has been the basis of a major part of
the litigation involving the savings bank trust. This avenue of
revocation is that described by the Restatement as "a manifes-
tation of his intent to revoke the trust. No particular formalities
are necessary to manifest such an intention."7 8 This very broad
and flexible power of revocation has its roots in the Totten case
which indicated that revocation could be brought about by
"some decisive act or declaration of disaffirmance. ' ' 79
Speculation is probably futile as to why such a broad power of
revocation was thought a necessary component of the doctrine
upholding the device. A likely surmise is the general trust law
rule that when a power of revocation is retained by the settlor,
but the details of how it is to be exercised are not spelled out in
the trust, then the "power can be exercised in any manner which
sufficiently manifests the intention of the settlor to revoke the
trust. Any definitive manifestation by the settlor of his intention
that the trust should be forthwith revoked is sufficient." 80
While hindsight usually provides superior perception, it does
not appear that the broad power of revocation by "any words or
conduct on the part of the depositor indicating an intention to
revoke it" 81 is an essential component of the concept or is neces-
sary to achieve the societal goals attained by recognizing the
savings bank trust. The recognition of such a power of revoca-
tion has been the occasion of frequent litigation involvipg the
ascertaining of the intent of the depositor and whether such
intent is sufficiently manifested or whether the words or con-
duct are suitably "decisive." Such a power of revocation makes
complex a device conceived and approved for its simplicity.
82
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 58, comment c (1959). "Where the
depositor has not manifested an intention to make the trust irrevocable, he may
revoke it any way in which his intention to revoke is manifested." Id. § 58
Appendix, comment c (1959).
79. In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 125, 71 N.E. 748, 752, 70 L.R.A. 711 (1904).
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330, comment i (1959); see A. Scott, 4
THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 330.7 at 2605 (3d ed. 1967).
81. A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 58.4 at 536 (3d ed. 1967).
82. "Where used for testamentary purposes, such a device is valuable only
if it may be used by laymen without the aid of attorneys, and thus the rules of
law should be uniform and simple of application. Unfortunately, they are not."
Comment, Disposition of Bank Accounts: The Poor Man's Will, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 103, 104 (1953).
The basic informality of such a potential power of revocation
begets the problems. Since no formalities are prescribed for the
revocation and the only criteria specified stipulates that the
revocatory act must be decisive, the ambit of potential disagree-
ment and attendant litigation is apparent. Examples of such
acts sometimes held to be a revocation are the depositor's oral
statements and his inter vivos (as distinguished from direction
in a will) written statements. The Statute of Wills traditionally
proscribes the variety of problems and disputes that are fre-
quently found in such revocations of savings bank trusts.
An oral declaration of revocation by the depositor theoretical-
ly can revoke the savings bank trust. Perhaps because the de-
positor rarely understands that he has such a power and the
general reluctance of the courts to accept testimony of witnes-
ses as to their recollections of such declarations, few cases
squarely turn on an oral declaration alone as a basis of revoca-
tion.83 The courts tend to hold such declarations as not being
sufficiently decisive and look for other conduct of the depositor
confirming such intention to revoke. 84 In such cases the de-
positor rarely says "I hereby revoke" but rather talks in terms
of future intent to revoke,85 or a desire that another person have
the funds86 or an intent to attend to the revocation by will.87
The wide array of evidence that may be sought and utilized in
proving a revocation has been described as follows:
Thus, counsel seeking to establish the revocation will wish to mar-
shal all possible evidence bearing on the settlor's intention, including
not only evidence of his written and oral declarations, but also proof
of the attendant actions and circumstances tending to confirm the
revocatory intent.88
83. In a recent (1972) annotation on savings bank trust revocation, the
author indicated a failure to discover a single litigated case in which an oral
declaration alone had been the basis of finding an intent to revoke. ANNOT. 46
A.L.R. 3d 487,494 (1972). "[C]ourts are not disposed to allow frail memory of oral
declarations to overcome the clear terms of the trusts." Id. at 498.
84. Id. at 501.
85. See In Re Estate of Service, 49 Misc. 2d 399, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 782 (1965); and
In Re Estate of Stelma, 25 Misc. 2d 234, 201 N.Y.S. 2d 609 (1960).
86. See Garlick v. Garlick, 53 N.Y.S. 2d 321 (Sup. Ct. King's Co., 1945).
87. See Litsey v. First Federal Savings and Loan Assoc., 243 So. 2d 239, 46
A.L.R. 3d 477 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
88. ANNOT. 46 A.L.R. 3d 487, 498 (1972). The problems that inhere in such
evidence have been noted:
"Much of the litigation involving deposits 'in trust' could be avoided by a clear
expression of intention by the depositors. Since such persons invariably act
without the guidance of counsel and frequently have not clearly formulated in
their own mind their wishes it is not surprising that their statements are often
vague and indefinite. The testimony. . . as to what the depositor told him is
liable to be influenced more by a recently acquired understanding of the essen-
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Adding another dimension to the cloudy area of revocation by
oral declaration is a series of cases involving the depositor's oral
declarations made in conjunction with the execution of his will.
In these cases it has been held that oral declarations made at the
execution of the depositor's will, coupled with the content of the
will, can be sufficient to revoke the savings bank trust. In such
cases it was the depositor's conduct in executing the will that
made the declaration a sufficiently decisive indicator of the
depositor's intention to revoke. 89
Revocation by inter vivos writing would appear to be less
fraught with confusion, but litigation involving such an indica-
tion of intent to revoke is almost as varied and numerous as
that dealing with revocation by oral declaration. Letters, re-
voked wills, invalid wills and other writings present a complex
web from which the depositor's intention, or lack of intention, to
revoke is sought. Again, the question of whether the depositor
was actually aware of his ability to revoke in such a manner is a
conjecture that may make the courts' task even more
complicated.
Letters which tend to be testamentary in nature, while not
meeting the requirements of a will, are sometimes held to be a
revocation even if they do not clearly express the intent to re-
voke. 90 Other courts have disregarded the nature of the letter in
tials of a valid trust than by an accurate recollection of years old conversations.
Looseness of expression gives the administrator of the deceased depositor a
ready foothold to attack the trust." Moynihan, Trusts of Savings Deposits in
Massachusetts, 22 B. U. L. REV. 271, 279 (1942).
"[T]he inaccuracies of oral testimony owing to the lapse of memory, misin-
terpretation of the statements of others, and the more or less unconscious
coloring of recollection in the light of the personal interest of the witness or of
those with whom he is friendly, are very prevalent, and the possibilities of
perjury and forgery cannot be disregarded." Gulliver and Tilson, Classification
of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L. J. 1, 4 (1941).
89. See Walsh v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 106 Misc. 628, 176
N.Y.S. 418, affd. without op. 192 App. Div. 908, 182 N.Y.S. 956, affd without op.
233 N.Y. 512, 135 N.E. 897 (1919); In Re Estate of Athanasion, 24 Misc. 2d 12, 202
N.Y.S. 2d 675 (1960); In Re Rodgers' Estate, 374 Pa. 246, 97 A.2d 789,38 A.L.R. 2d
1238 (1953). But see In re Deneff's Will, 44 Misc. 2d 947, 255 N.Y.S. 2d 347 (1964).
"When an intervivos declaration or a will does not revoke the trust expressly
but is alleged to do so by implication, the courts tend to look at the res gestae
surrounding the action in order to determine the depositor's real intent." Wit-
tebort, Savings Account Trusts: A Critical Examination, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW.
686, 698 (1974).
90. See In re Bearinger's Estate, 336 Pa. 253, 9 A.2d 342 (1939).
seeking the decisive act of revocation.9 1
The inter vivos writing in the form of an invalid will poses
another facet to the quest for revocatory intent. New York case
law refuses to accept the invalid will as in indicator of intent to
revoke, 92 while the Pennsylvania courts apparently are not de-
terred in recognizing such a document as an indication of the
depositor's revocatory intent.9 3 The courts in such cases are
faced with deciding whether a valid method of revocation (by
will) that fails because of lack of formalities can be considered
separately as an inter vivos writing for the purpose of revoca-
tion.
The question of the effect of a valid will which revokes the
savings bank trust, but later itself is revoked has been con-
sidered by a California court. In Brucks v. Home Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Association94 the court held that the revocation
of a savings bank trust by a holographic will was not affected or
nullified by a later revocation of the will.
Powers of attorney,95 instructions to the bank96 and con-
tracts97 are examples of other inter vivos writings that have
been found to be suitable demonstrations of the depositor's
intent to revoke. Further, the depositor's obliterating the name
of the beneficiary98 and the use of the passbook as security for a
debt9 9 have been held to be acceptable evidence of intent to
revoke. To further complicate the search for the depositor's
intent to revoke, the courts have sometimes considered the rela-
tionship of the beneficiary to the depositor,100 the depositor's
subsequent treatment of the account following the alleged revo-
cation, 1'0 1 and the physical location of the account passbook. 0 2
Thus, the possibility of revocation of the savings bank trust by
any decisive manifestation of the depositor's intent provides a
91. See In re Schiffer's Estate, 142 Misc. 518, 254 N.Y.S. 871 (1931); In re
Ryan's Will, 52 N.Y.S. 2d 502 (Surr. 1944).
92. See Estate of Baquiche, 4 Misc. 2d 614, 152 N.Y.S. 2d 146 (1956).
93. See In re Bearinger's Estate, 336 Pa. 253, 9 A.2d 342 (1939); compare In
re Krewson's Estate, 154 Pa. Super. 509, 36 A.2d 250 (1944).
94. 36 Cal. 2d 845, 228 P.2d 545 (1951).
95. See Roberts v. Goetz, 5 Cal. App. 3d 364, 85 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1970)..l
96. See Rush v. South Brooklyn Savings Inst. 65 Misc. 66, 119 N.Y.S. 726,
affd. per curriam, 134 App. Div. 981, 119 N.Y.S. 726 (1909).
97. See In re Sterling, 264 App. Siv. 308, 35 N.Y.S. 2d 399, affd. without op,
290 N.Y. 820, 50 N.E. 2d 234 (1943).
98. See In re Bulwinkle, 107 App. Div. 331, 95 N.Y.S. 176 (1905).
99. See Evinger v. MacDougall, 28 Cal. App. 2d 175, 82 P.2d 194 (1938).
100. See In re Schuck's Estate, 419 Pa. 466, 214 A.2d 629 (1965); In re Kart-
zowitz Will, 59 Misc. 2d 595, 301 N.Y.S. 2d 369 (1969).
101. See In re Deneff's Will, 44 Misc. 2d 947, 255 N.Y.S. 2d 347 (1964).
102. See In re Beck's Estate, 260 App. Div. 651, 23 N.Y.S. 2d 525 (1940).
[Vol. 5: 21, 1977] A Less Tentative Totten
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
fertile setting for litigation upon the depositor's death. Those
who would take the funds in the absence of the device are free to
examine the words, writings and conduct of the deceased de-
positor to seek evidence that the savings bank trust had indeed
been revoked prior to the depositor's death.
EFFORTS AT REFORM
While the need for reform in limiting the avenues of revoca-
tion of savings bank trusts has been recognized in several quar-
ters, actual efforts to bring about reform have been limited. The
most powerful forces that might bring about the needed
changes, the financial institutions involved, have little in the
way of a vested interest in reform. They are protected by stat-
utes exonerating them from liability if they pay the designated
beneficiary. Frequently, they have further strengthened their
positions by the use of special forms for opening such accounts
which further specifically limit or eliminate their liability for
paying a designated beneficiary. 10 3
Although the revocation of savings bank trusts by will has not
been a prime source of litigation, it should be noted again that
the Uniform Probate Code provides that such accounts cannot
be revoked by will."° New York efforts at reform that would
have eliminated this avenue of revocation struck a particularly
sensitive nerve. 105
Remedial legislation codifying the savings bank trust concept
frequently has been called for as a solution to the problem.
10 6
103. See, Moynihan, Trusts of Savings Deposits in Massachusetts, 22 B. U.
L. REV. 271, 279 (1942); Tabis, Illinois Totten Trust: The Rights of Legal Repre-
sentatives of a Beneficiary Who Predeceases the Trustee, 48 CHI-KENT L. REV.
107, 107 (1971); G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 49 at p. 358,
footnote 79 (2d ed. 1965).
104. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 6-104; see ANNOT. 46 A.L.R. 3d 487,497 (1972).
105. In 1974 the New York legislature passed legislation codifying the sav-
ings bank trust doctrine and limiting the powers of revocation to the total
exclusion of revocation by will. Opposition (led by several groups of the organ-
ized bar) to the removal of the power of testamentary revocation influenced the
Governor to veto the measure. At the next legislative session the measure was
again introduced (this time allowing limited revocation by will) and met both
legislative and gubernatorial approval. See Fried, Decedents' Estates, 26 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 311, 315 (1975) and Fried, Decedents Estates, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV.
329, 333 (1976).
106. Moynihan, Trusts of Savings Deposits in Massachusetts, 22 B. U. L.
REV. 271, 285-286 (1942); Wittebort, Savings Account Trusts: A Critical Exami-
New Jersey, after a stormy history of litigation involving the
savings bank trusts, enacted such legislation. That statute'017
provides that revocation is only permissible during the lifetime
of the depositor by the withdrawal of funds and by the pre-
deceasing of the beneficiary. It is submitted that the statutory
treatment probably closely parallels the depositor's actual con-
ception of his power of revocation:
In 1975 the New York legislature codified the savings bank
trust concept and restricted the power of revocation. The new
statute'0 8 provides that during the depositor's lifetime the trust
can be revoked only by withdrawal of funds or by express
direction in a will. It is significant that this change took place in
the jurisdiction that led popular acceptance of the device.
The Maryland courts have been more direct and responsive in
dealing with the problems connected with revocation. Not feel-
ing deterred by the judicial precedents of other jurisdictions,
they have simply held that revocation is only allowable during
the depositor's lifetime and only by withdrawal of the account
funds. 109
JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY
The call for legislative reform of the law of savings bank
trusts has continued for several decades. Such relief seems un-
nation, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 686, 699 (1974); Note, Bank Account Trusts, 49 VA.
L. REV. 1189, 1208 (1963); Note, Disposition of Bank Accounts: The Poor Man's
Will, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 103, 116 (1953); Note, The Theory of the Tentative Trust,
87 U. PA. L. REV. 847, 355 (1939); Note, Tentative Trust Deposits, 39 DICK. L. REV.
37, 42 (1934); Tabis, Illinois Totten Trust: The Rights of Legal Representatives
of a Beneficiary Who Predeceases the Trustee, 48 CHI-KENT L. REV. 107,112-113
(1971); Casenote, 39 CAL. L. REV. 314, 317 (1951).
107. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A-216-A(1) (West 1963). For a discussion of the
history of the savings bank trust in New Jersey, culminating in the codification
of the concept see A. SCOTT, 1 THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 58.3 at 531-533 (3d ed. 1967).
108. NEW YORK ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW § 7-5.2 (1) and (2), (McKin-
ney Supp. 1976). See note 105 supra.
109. "Maryland decisions indicate quite clearly that a bank deposit is revoc-
able only during the settlor's lifetime by the withdrawal of the funds." Bradford
v. Eutaw Say. Bank of Baltimore, 186 Md. 127, 132, 46 A.2d 284, 286 (1946).
Compare Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212, 43 A.43 (1899); Hopkins Place Sav.
Bank v. Holzer 175 Md. 481, 2 A.2d 639 (1938); Ghingner v. Fanseen 166 Md. 519,
172 A. 75 (1934); Fairfax v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 175 Md. 136, 199 A. 872
(1938).
"In Maryland, it appears that 'tentative' trusts identical in effect to those
covered by the Restatement, Trusts 2d, § 58 have acquired recognition but are
revocable only by the depositor's withdrawal of the trust account funds during
his lifetime." ANNOT., 46 A.L.R. 3d 487, 510 (1974). See Katzenstein, Joint Sav-
ings Bank Accounts in Maryland, 3 MD. L. REV. 109, 129-146 (1939); Wittebort,
Savings Account Trusts: A Critical Examination, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 686,695
(1974).
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likely to be achieved to any marked extent primarily because of
the lack of organized interests willing to expend their resources
and efforts to bring about the changes needed. The inactivity of
legislators cannot be legitimately interpreted as legislative ap-
proval of the existing common law rules.'10
The solution lies in the judiciary of the jurisdictions recogniz-
ing the common law concept of the savings bank trust."' The
savings bank trust is a judicial creation. The solution to the
litigation-spawning rules of revocation should be provided by
the courts, not left to legislators who usually are reluctant to
dabble in changing common law rules in the absence of public
outcry.1 2 The leadership provided by the Maryland courts
should be followed by other jurisdictions.
Since the savings bank trusts are foreign to the law of trusts in
many respects and must be considered as a basic exception to
110. "Closely related is an old cliche, never with much truth in it, that is
today being rejected on its merits. This was that, after a judge-made rule of
law-good, bad, or indifferent-had been announced by decision at some earlier
time, and the legislature over a period of years had not by new statute changed
the rule (as of course it had the power to do), the legislative silence constituted
an approval of the rule, a sort of tacit reenactment of it, giving it a greater force
than it originally possessed, and constituting an additional reason against recon-
sideration and overruling of even an unwise decision. That interpretation of
,'legislative silence' is unsound. State legislature make no effort to keep up with
the mass of judge-made common law. Their attention is mainly centered on
matters having to do with the organization of government, taxation, regulation
of utilities, crime and public morality, issues of whatever nature are currently
exciting the public." Leflar, The Great and Common Law, 30 ARK. L. REV. 395,
403 (1977).
111. "In my opinion the Totten trust is the sort of development that can be
worked out by the courts rather than by a state statute. The courts can mold and
shape and give life and adapt." Note, Totten Trust: The Poor Man's Will, 42 N.C.
L. REV. 214, 219 (1963).
112. "Judge-made rules controlling the rights of parties to private litigation
seldom come to legislative attention unless some lawyer-legislator, unhappy
because he has lost a case in court, seeks legislative reversal of his own prior
defeat. Even that happens less often nowadays than it once did. The fact is that
legislators deliberately leave most common law matters to the common law
courts. Even if a bill designed to change a common law rule be introduced, most
legislators will ignore it, not because they believe the rule should not be changed
but rather because the mass of judge-made law should be left to the judges to
handle. 'It's their job, not ours,' say the busy legislators. Legislative silence may
mean almost anything. Guessing at its meaning is a futile undertaking. Most
often it means nothing. At least that is all that it can ordinarily be proved to
mean." Leflar, The Great and Common Law, 30 ARK. L. REV. 395,404 (1977). See
Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking: Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who
Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787 (1963).
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the usual requirements of the Statute of Wills, there is no valid
reason, other than judicial precedent, for the courts' reluctance
to hold that revocation can only be accomplished during the
depositor's lifetime by withdrawal of the funds.113 In a body of
law ostensibly based on the presumed intention of the depositor,
such a construction would be more closely aligned with the
probable intent, or at least comprehension, of the depositor in
regard to his power of revocation.
The reluctance of courts to change a basic tenet of the doc-
trine, 114 espoused by the Restatement, is predictable and
perhaps understandable. It is an instance in which courts
should recognize their responsibility to correct a basic defect in
judicial legislation of long standing. The American Law Insti-
tute in its Restatement of Trusts should exert leadership that
would facilitate such judicial reform. 1 5
113. "Requiring a withdrawal of funds for this purpose [revocation] works
no hardship and frustrates no legitimate expectations." Fried, Decedent's Es-
tates, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 311, 315 (1975).
114. The overruling of the judicial precedents could be done retroactively or
prospectively only. The circumstances indicating prospective judicial modifica-
tion, as suggested by Justice Traynor, do not appear to be present in this
situation. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial
Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L. J. 533, 540-543 (1977).
"A new rule announced in a current decision, apart from being applied in the
principal case, can be made applicable to cases tried thereafter only, or only to
cases the facts of which occur thereafter, or only to transactions that take place
after a named future date, or only after the adjournment of the next session of
the legislature (if the court thinks that the subject matter is one that the legisla-
ture might wish to deal with now that the judicial decision has called attention to
it.) If the new decision involves no overruling, the prospectivity issue does not
arise. Most judicial decisions, even overrulings, do not call for prospective
treatment. The great majority of judicial decisions involve situations in which
there has been no justifiable reliance by anyone on prior contrary law. In those
cases, the newly announced rule can be applied across the board, retroactively
as well as prospectively. And the prospectivity technique can take care of the
remaining small number of reliance cases." Leflar, The Great and Common
Law, 30 ARK. L. REV. 396, 401 (1977).
See Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts:" Techniques of Prospective Over-
ruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631 (1967); Note Prospective-Prospective Overruling,
51 MINN. L. REV. 79 (1966).
It must be borne in mind that many jurisdictions have not yet accepted the
common law savings bank trust doctrine. Should they elect to do so, an opportu-
nity is afforded to prevent the revocation problems in the savings bank trust's
initial recognition.
115. Notwithstanding the significant contributions of the American Law
Institute in bringing together and analyzing the law of trusts in its Restatements,
it has not been known for its leadership in exerting influence for reform in the
field.
"Rather than chart and evaluate the judicial adjustment between conflicting
policies, trust theory, so far, has been primarily relegated to the Restatement of
rules. The Restatement culls rules from factual situations involving different
compromises, states them to be conflicting, and chooses one rule as correct.
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Justice Roger J. Traynor catches the spirit of this responsibili-
ty in these words:
There are, of course, precedents originally so unsatisfactory or
grown so unsatisfactory with time as to deserve liquidation. Unfortu-
nately a court often lacks the forthrightness to bring about their de-
mise. Instead it may pursue the unhappy alternatives of keeping them
alive and kicking irrationally or sustaining them half alive. It may
blindly follow precedent only because it lacks the wit or the will or the
courage to spell out why the precedent no longer deserves to be
followed . . . .Courts are often so dismayed by the extent of an un-
necessary evil as to retreat into defeatism. The case law has come to
such a state, they are want to say, that only the legislature can set
things aright. Ironically, judges themselves are all too ready to seize
on this rationalization to shift to others the responsibility of overruling
judgemade bad law. This is evasion, not mere abstentious avoidance
of judicial responsibility. The time is ripe for redress and no one can
undertake it more appropriately than the judges themselves. Their
inaction speaks louder than words to perpetuate error and confu-
sion." 6
Devoid of other alternatives as a ground for decision, courts articulate their
decisions in terms of rules, counterrules, exceptions, and conflicting characteri-
zations. The result is not only a maze of conflicting rules, but also a puzzle
whether the courts achieve a rational compromise or whether the rule dictated
the result. To those dissatisfied with the Restatement's theory and in search of
coherence in the judicial process, no alternatives are presently available." Ereli,
The Trust: Salvation by Muddle, 12 UCLA L. REV. 190, 190 (1964).
"Unfortunately, the spirit of reform is not reflected in Trust Restatements.
This might be due to the sparsity of concern on the part of commentators....
This non-critical attitude toward trust theory has continued to prevail .... Id.
at 193-194. See Note, The Theory of the Tentative Trust, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 847,
853-855 (1939).
116. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial
Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L. J. 533, 538, 540 (1977).
"The common law system could not have survived through the centuries if it
had been no more than a method of perpetuating its own past. It has survived
and is healthy today because in the hands of wise judges it is a system that calls
for growth, one that builds on the past to meet the needs of the present and the
future. The system will not tolerate hog-wild innovation, but without innovation,
it will die-it would have died long ago. Legislatures can aid the courts in
updating the law, but much of the ultimate responsibility rests upon our appel-
late courts, and specifically, upon the judges who sit on those courts." Leflar,
The Great and Common Law, 30 ARK L. REV. 395, 409 (1977).
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